ECONOMIC EVIDENCE OF CARTEL IN THE RESALE OF LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS (LPG) IN CAMPINA GRANDE-PB

Abstract

The objective of this article was to detect economic signs of cartel in the resale of LPG in Campina Grande-PB from January 2006 to June 2020. This relevant market presents characteristics that provide cartelized behavior by the companies that operate in it. In addition, it was the target of an investigation into the formation of a cartel by the Brazilian Antitrust Agency. To meet the proposed objective, three behavioral economic screening were used: method suggested by the National Petroleum Agency; Conditional Heteroscedasticity Autoregressive Model (ARCH) and, finally, the estimation of an Error Correction Model (MCE). The results found, from the application of the filters, suggested that there are economic signs of cartels in LPG resale in Campina Grande-PB, from January 2006 to June 2020. In addition, the screening that are usually used to detect evidence of cartels in the resale of common gasoline, were efficient in investigating conspiracy in the resale of LPG